Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics by Wright, R. George
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 7
Spring 1991
Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for
Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics
R. George Wright
Cumberland School of Law, Samford University
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
R. G. Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 855 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol18/iss3/7
SHOULD THE LAW REFLECT THE WORLD?: LESSONS
FOR LEGAL THEORY FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
I. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY law and legal theory have been deeply influ-
enced by the reigning models and metaphors of science.' Even be-
fore the rise of modern science, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages
was reflected in the political and legal hierarchy of medievalism. 2 The
rise of Newtonian physics in turn influenced the assumptions underly-
ing legal and political documents such as the American Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. 4
Some sort of linkage between the order of being, or of what sorts of
things exist, and how we ought to order our social affairs has tradi-
tionally been assumed. 5 The rise of post-Newtonian physics has led
scientists and legal theorists to raise the question of this linkage anew. 6
The centerpiece of post-Newtonian physics has been the development
of quantum mechanics. 7 This Article seeks to explore the linkage be-
tween quantum mechanics and contemporary legal theory.
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. My thanks for
their encouragement and comments to Martha Minow and John Leslie, neither of whom, of
course, bears any responsibility for the Article.
1. See N. HERBERT, QUANTUM REAITY: BEYOND THE NEw PHYsics XI (1985); Levit, Lis-
tening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 59 FORDHAM L. REv.
263, 264 (1989).
2. See N. HERBERT, supra note 1, at xi.
3. See id. at xi-xii.
4. See Toffler, Foreword: Science and Change, in I. PR1I0oHn & I. STENGERS, ORDER
OUT OF CHAOS: MAN'S NEw DIALOGUE WITH NATURE xiii (1984); Tribe, The Curvature of Con-
stitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 &
n.5 (1989); Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1967, 1987 n.96 (1987).
5. See P. FOREST, QUANTUM METAPHYSiCS xiii (1988).
6. See, e.g., J. JAUCH, ARE QUANTA REAL?: A GALILEAN DIALoGUE 97 (1973); Jones,
Complementarity as a Way of Life, in NIELS BoHR: A CENTENARY VOLUME 320, 320 (A. French
& P. Kennedy eds. 1985). Among legal theorists, see Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Juris-
prudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1401 (1986) (quantum mechanics and other develop-
ments as showing that "nature is on our side").
7. See M. JAMMER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHtAics: THE INTERPRETATIONS OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE v (1974). Jammer argues:
Never in the history of science has there been a theory which has had such a profound
impact on human thinking as quantum mechanics; nor has there been a theory which
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For the sake of manageability, the focus will be primarily upon re-
lationships between quantum mechanics and three representative
schools or movements within contemporary legal theory, specifically,
feminist legal theory, the Critical Legal Studies movement, and the
economic analysis of law. Each of these three movements is character-
ized by great internal diversity," just as quantum mechanics is itself
subject to a wide range of conflicting interpretations. 9 Therefore, cer-
tain lessons may be valid only if we accept some particular interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, and the lessons from quantum mechanics
may apply most usefully only to particular strains of thought within
feminist theory, Critical Legal Studies, or the law and economics
movement.10 Quantum theory, however, generally can speak power-
fully and evocatively to each of these schools of legal thought.
Before we begin to make good that assertion, certain disclaimers are
in order. First, this Article does not argue for the truth or validity of
quantum theory, generally or in any particular version. Quantum the-
ory deserves attention because it has been hugely influential." Second,
this Article need not endorse or condemn in blanket fashion any of
scored such spectacular successes in the prediction of such an enormous variety of
phenomena.. . . Furthermore, for all that is known today, quantum mechanics is the
only consistent theory of elementary processes.
Id. For an extremely concise formulation of some of the basic elements of quantum theory, most
of which will be referred to at various points below, see Albert & Loewer, Interpreting the Many
Worlds Interpretation, 77 SYNrrnsE 195, 195 (1988).
8. For references to the diversity of feminist scholarship, see Minow, Beyond Universality,
1989 U. Cm. LEOAL F. 115, 134-35; Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. Rav. 617
(1990) (referring to both feminist and Critical Legal Studies); Sunstein, Introduction: Notes on
Feminist Political Thought, 99 ETmCS 219 (1989). On the diversity of Critical Legal Studies, see
M. KELmAN, A GUIDE TO CaRTCAL LEoAL STUDIS 2 (1987); Critical Legal Studies Symposium,
36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75
CAIF. L. REv. 609, 610 (1987); Rhode, supra; Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing
Critical Dogma, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 462, 462, 463 & n.2 (1987). On the law and economics
movement, see Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the
Economic Approach to Law, 94 Ermcs 649, 678 (1984) (contrasting James Buchanan's constitu-
tional economics with more traditional law and economics); Kelman, Misunderstanding Social
Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics, " 33 J. LEoAL EDUC. 274 (1983)
("I am by no means certain whether one can define, without considerable distortion, a 'core' to
legal economics.").
9. See N. HERBERT, supra note 1; R. HUGHES, THE STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETATION OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS 1 (1989); French, Identity and Individuality in Classical and Quantum
Physics, 67 AusTRALAsIAN J. PHi. 432, 445 (1989); Hellman, Introduction to Special Issue on
the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 18 Nous 557, 558 (1984).
10. Cf. French, supra note 9, at 446 ("[M]ore than one 'metaphysical package' may be
consistent with a given physical theory.").
11. See M. JA R, supra note 7, at v; H. PAGELS, TH COSMIC CODE: QUANTUM PHYSICS
As TrE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 25-27, 41, 66-67 (1982); J. POLKINGHORNE, THE QUANTrUM WORLD
5 (1984).
LESSONS FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS
the jurisprudential movements discussed. 12 Rather, the focus will be
on how feminists, critical legal scholars, and legal economists each
might constructively profit from the perspectives and insights of quan-
tum theory. Third, this Article will not assume that the relationship
between physical theory and legal theory must be hierarchical,' 3 or
that scientific theory is itself unaffected by social practice and social
theory.' 4 Finally, this Article does not assume that the lessons of
quantum mechanics for legal theory will be dictatorial, or somehow
logically inescapable. The most valuable lessons of quantum theory
for legal theory are more a matter of suggestiveness, analogy, inspira-
tion, and resonant metaphor than of strict deductive inference. 5 This
is not at all to suggest that quantum theory is confined, at least di-
rectly, to the microscopic realm, or that quantum phenomena are not
exhibited on the sort of scale with which human beings are most di-
rectly familiar. Quite the opposite is true. 6 Most of the lessons for the
law from quantum mechanics are, however, merely offered rather
than inescapably imposed.
This Article will proceed by briefly discussing some of the elements
or interpretations of quantum mechanics that seem most richly sug-
gestive for legal theory. In particular, the jurisprudential implications
of what might be called "quantum-based universal relational holism"
will be emphasized. Universal relational holism offers an attractive,
natural synthesis of often apparently conflicting jurisprudential
themes and methods. While some of the possible implications of these
elements or interpretations of quantum mechanics for legal theory will
be left implicit until the later portions of the Article, the reader with a
particular interest in feminist legal studies, Critical Legal Studies, or
law and economics is invited to begin inferring relationships between
quantum mechanics and legal theory at any point. The drawing of
such relationships in many cases will be controversial; such a task can-
not in any event be completed within the bounds of this Article.
12. But cf. Hughes, Bell's Theorem, Ideology, and Structural Explanation, in P.osopm-
CAL. CONSEQUENCES OF QuATum THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON B.t's THEOREM 195, 196 (J. Cush-
ing & E. McMullin eds. 1989) (raising the possibility of, but not developing, a feminist analysis
of certain elements of quantum theory).
13. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1-2.
14. See P. FEY ~ErAND, AOAINST METHOD 209 (1978) (arguing for a "democratic" ap-
proach to the truth of quantum theory).
15. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 2 (employing the language of metaphor and illumination in
this context).
16. See, e.g., P. FOR EsT, supra note 5, at 56-57; Clarke, Quantum Theory and Cosmol-
ogy, 41 Prn. Scm. 317 (1974); DeWitt, Quantum Mechanics and Reality, in THE MANY WORLDS
INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 155 (B. DeWitt & N. Graham eds. 1973); Shimony,
The Reality of the Quantum World, 258 Sci. AM. 46, 46 (Jan. 1988); Teller, Quantum Mechan-
ics and the Nature of Continuous Physical Quantities, 76 J. PI. 345, 358 (1979).
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II. INDETERMINACY AND THE HEISENBERG UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
If there is any single element of quantum theory upon which legal
writers have been least reluctant to seize, it is undoubtedly what has
come to be known as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.' 7 Legal
writers have taken the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to mean that,
inevitably, the very act of measuring an object under scrutiny physi-
cally disturbs or alters that object.' s This is thought to impose limits
on the extent to which we can know objects "in themselves," or in
their pristine state, 19 and to call into question the idea of a clear con-
ceptual separation between the observer and the object being ob-
served. 20 Beyond this, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle has been
cited as authority for the subjectivity of at least some scientific judg-
ments.
2
'
This interpretation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle offers,
by way of analogy, some useful insights into legal practice and legal
theory. Just as a Western anthropologist cannot helicopter down into
an isolated village without in some measure altering that which was
intended to be measured,2 so a Supreme Court cannot, for example,
measure the degree to which an asserted right is fundamental or basic
to our political institutions23 without, in the very act of measurement,
to some degree affecting that which is to be measured.
This interpretation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, how-
ever, is not the only interpretation available. The principle itself is a
matter of mathematical formulae3' While it is possible to interpret
those formulae, as lawyers and some quantum theorists25 do, in terms
17. For a sampling of references to this principle by legal writers, see, e.g., Bradley, The
Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.5; Christenson, Uncertainty
in Law and its Negation: Reflections, 54 U. CN. L. Rv. 347, 351 (1985); Levit, supra note 1, at
295; Tribe, supra note 4, at 17-20; Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence
and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 441 (1987).
18. See each of the references cited supra note 17.
19. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 19.
20. See id.
21. See Christenson, supra note 17, at 351.
22. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 19.
23. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
24. For brief discussions of the simple mathematical formulae involved, see 1 R. FEYNMA4,
R. LEIGHTON & M. SANDS, THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS 37-11 (1963); P. GmBINS, PARTI-
cLEs AND PARADOXES: THE LIMTs OF QUANTUM LoGic 59 (1987); K. POPPER, QUANTUM THEORY
AND THE SCHISm IN PHYSICS 16 (1982); A. RAE, QuANTUm PHYSICS: ILLUSION OR REALITY? 10-11
(1986).
25. See, e.g., I R. FEYNmAN, R. LEIGHTON & M. SArDs, supra note 24, at 38-8; W. HEISEN-
BERG, THE PHYsICAL PRiNcnPixs OF THE QuANTuM THEORY 3, 20 (C. Eckart & F. Hoyt trans.
1930). An early comment on the principle by Niels Bohr held that "the product of the mean
errors with which two canonically conjugate mechanical quantities may be simultaneously meas-
ured can never be smaller than the quantum of action." N. BoHm, ATOMIC THEORY AND THE
DESCRIPTION OF NATURE 95 (1961) (1929 formulation).
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of the above "inevitable measurement disturbance" model, it is also
possible to interpret the principle in another, perhaps more interesting
way. The physicist Niels Bohr in particular rejected the measurement
disturbance model in favor of what might be called an "inherent inde-
terminacy" model;2 others have done the same.27
According to this more radical "inherent indeterminacy" interpre-
tation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a degree of indefinite-
ness or indeterminateness is associated with certain pairs of variables,
such as a particle's position and momentum; mathematics or nature
itself, rather than our physical disturbance of the system, underlies the
uncertainties in the simultaneous measurement of those variables. On
this more radical interpretation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Princi-
ple, certain quantities are simply not well defined, as a matter of
mathematics or nature.n Thus, the range of those uncertainties, multi-
plied together, is not, in one trial or over a series of trials,' 9 reducible
below a certain small quantity related to what is referred to as
Planck's constant.3 0 In plain terms, a particle does not have both a
definite position and momentum with which our measurement awk-
wardly interferes.3 The particle simply does not possess such definite
attributes simultaneously, whether observed or not.32
This indeterminism is obviously difficult to visualize. 3 At the level
of logic, rather than visualization, the reader may vaguely recall from
26. It should be noted that Heisenberg himself endorsed this more radical interpretation.
See W. HEISENBERG, PHMosoPHIcA. PRORnMS OF QUANTUM PHYSICS 46 (F. Hayes trans. 1979)
("it is of the greatest importance that to speak simultaneously of a definite position and a defi-
nite impulse of a particle is meaningless."). For discussions of Bohr's approach, see P. GiBNms,
supra note 24, at 53; M. REDHEAD, INCOMPLETENESS, NoNI.ocAIrY, AND REALISM: A PROLEGOM-
ENON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF QuANrrum MECHANICS 50 (1987); Hooker, Energy and the Interpre-
tation of Quantum Mechanics, 49 AUsTRALASIAN J. Pam. 262, 268-69 (1971).
27. See, e.g., P. DAVIES & J. BROWN, THE GHOST IN THE ATOM 6-7 (1986); N. HERBERT,
supra note 1, at 110; J. PoLOINHoRNE, supra note 11, at 28; I. PRIGOGINE & I. STENGERS, supra
note 4, at 224.
28. See 1. PRIoOGNE & I. STENGERS, supra note 4, at 224.
29. For series-of-measurements interpretations, see H. PAGELS, supra note 11, at 88-90; W.
HEISENBERG, supra note 25, at 20. For Bohr's individual particle interpretation, see P. GIBIrNS,
supra note 24, at 58-60.
30. For those keeping score, Planck's constant is 6.63 times 10 to the minus 34th power
joule-seconds. J. PoLxtoHoRNE, supra note 11, at 6.
31. Note that we can sometimes measure a quantity without interacting with the object, as
by recording that the object has not appeared at a particular place. See N. HERBERT, supra note
1, at 160.
32. See K. POPPER, supra note 24, at 17-18.
33. One hopeless way of trying to think about the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is to
envision a gun shooting atomic-sized particles through holes of variable size at a target some
further distance away. Our intuitions might suggest that as we diminish the size of the holes
through which the emitted particle must pass, we increase the accuracy or concentration of re-
sults toward the center of the target. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, however, dictates
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high school mathematics that there is no commutative law for the
multiplication of matrices, as opposed to ordinary integers.3 4 Matrix A
times Matrix B need not equal Matrix B times Matrix A. Ultimately, it
is this lack of commutativity that most directly expresses the Heisen-
berg Uncertainty Principle, 5 because matrices turn out to be the natu-
ral way of expressing particle position and momentum.3 6
The "radical" interpretation of the principle, therefore, calls into
question the validity of classical realism. Under this interpretation,
certain states of affairs are simply "fuzzy" and indeterminate. If our
photographs of such states of affairs look blurry, the explanation may
lie not in our focusing, but in the inherent blurriness of the object
being photographed. This interpretation is worth pursuing for its pos-
sible lessons for legal theory because, as we shall see below,3 7 both
Critical Legal Studies and, to a degree, feminist legal studies tend to
call into question doctrines of realism, system determinacy, and objec-
tivity in the law that seem analogous to those jeopardized particularly
by the radical interpretation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
III. REALisM, OBJECTIVITY, AND WAVE-PARTICLE DuALism
Thus far, we have referred to entities on the scale of electrons, pho-
tons, and so forth38 as "particles," as though such entities were une-
quivocally like miniature pellets. Quantum mechanics, unfortunately,
derails this comfortable assumption. Both the theory and the experi-
mental evidence seem to require that we think of atomic-sized phe-
nomena as resembling both particles and, incompatibly, 39 waves of
some sort.
If, for example, we set up an apparatus shooting electrons one at a
time through a barrier with two separate openings and at a target on
the other side, we can, by varying the experimental conditions, ob-
that at certain values, further reducing the size of the holes actually decreases the accuracy of the
firing or the concentration of the pattern of hits at the target. See J. BELL, SPEAKABLE AND
UNSPEAKABLE IN QUANTUM MECHANICS 182-84 (1987).
34. See H. CAMPBELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MATRICES, VECTORS, AND LINEAR PROGRAM-
MING 12, 44 (1965); C. MILLER & M. LIL, FUNDAMENTALS OF COLLEGE ALGEBRA 314 (2d ed.
1986). For further relevant mathematics, see generally J. ORTEGA, MATRIX THEORY (1987).
35. See P. GmBINS, supra note 24, at 25-27; H. PAGELS, supra note 11, at 76; I. PRIGOGINE
& I. STENGERS, supra note 4, at 223.
36. See H. PAGELS, supra note 11, at 75-76.
37. See infra notes 107-134 & accompanying text.
38. For our purposes, the behavior of all atomic and sub-atomic sized particles may be
treated as equivalent. See I R. FEYNMAN, R. LEIGHTON & M. SANDS, supra note 24, at 37-1.
39. Heisenberg observed that "it is obvious that a thing cannot be a form of wave motion
and composed of particles at the same time-the two concepts are too different." W. HEISEN-
BERG, supra note 25, at 10.
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serve either particle-like or wave-like behavior. If we set up electron
detectors at both of the openings, we discover that each electron goes
through one of the two openings, but not both, on the way to the
target, where the electron's arrival may be recorded as a discrete, par-
ticle-like impact. If, however, we instead pay attention only to the
pattern or distribution of electron arrivals, we discover wave-like be-
havior in the form of interference phenomena. The pattern of electron
arrivals is different from the combination of patterns that would re-
sult from mechanically "adding up" the patterns resulting from firing
at the target with one, and then the other, opening being closed. Re-
markably, no electron can reach certain places at the target if the bar-
rier has two openings; yet, some electrons do reach those places if
either one, but not both, of the openings is available.4
It seems unavoidable that the mere availability of a second route to
the target itself prevents the arrival of any electrons at particular loca-
tions on the target. 4' This curious result can be understood, at least
superficially, by thinking of each electron as some sort of wave. On
this approach, each electron, rather than being pellet-like, is thought
of as dispersed or smeared out spatially,42 so that a single electron can
at certain points interfere with itself, in wave-like fashion, cancelling
itself out and thereby preventing its appearance at certain locations on
the target. 4
3
If we insist on pressing ahead to ask of what electron waves consist,
or whether they are "real," the answers quickly become varied and
equivocal. 4 Our ordinary sense of the unshakeability of objectivity
and realism is jeopardized by answers suggesting that such waves are
merely "probability waves," or that such questions are unanswera-
ble.45 When we try to describe the world in this realm, at least insofar
40. For brief accounts of wave-particle dualism, see, e.g., J. BELL, supra note 33, at 182-87;
1 R. FEYNMAN, R. LrnIHToN & M. SANDS, supra note 24, at 37-2 to 37-9; P. GrBNs, supra note
24, at 37-40; A. RAE, supra note 24, at 6-9.
41. See J. BELL, supra note 33, at 185.
42. For brief discussions of the phenomenon of a particle existing in geographically
"spread-out" fashion, see, e.g., Jones, supra note 6, at 327; Piron, Quantum Mechanics: Fifty
Years Later, in SYMPosrum ON TH FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS 207, 210 (P. Lahti & P.
Mittelstaedt eds. 1985).
43. See J. BELL, supra note 33, at 185.
44. See infra note 49 & accompanying text. Unfortunately, even the term "realism" itself is
used in a variety of senses. Compare, e.g., P. FORREST, supra note 5, at 4 with A. FINE, THE
SHAKY GAME: EINsTEIN, REALISM AND THE QUANTUM THEORY 136-37 (1986).
45. See J. BELL, supra note 33, at 187; N. HERBERT, supra note 1, at 72. Even if we revert
to thinking exclusively in particle terms, quantum mechanics, including in particular the Heisen-
berg Uncertainty Principle, will not allow us to assume that a particle must cross the distance
between the gun and the target in a determinate, specifiable way. See Piron, supra note 42, at
210. Some theorists, however, say that the particle takes all possible paths simultaneously. N.
1991]
862 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:855
as we want a verbal, conceptual, or visual understanding, we seem to
be left only with analogies of limited value.46
One alternative is to conclude that atoms are not objective or real,
that we and the rest of the world are made up of atoms, that objectiv-
ity and realism generally are invalid, and ultimately, that traditional
legal theory can by parallel reasoning be shown to be self-contradic-
tory or subject to deconstruction in a literal sense. Consequently, legal
reasoning should be exposed as a sham when it makes any pretenses to
objectivity or realism.
Alternatively, we might choose not to dispense entirely with real-
ism, but to conclude that reality can on occasion be, in an admittedly
unvisualizable, inarticulable way, unavoidably dualistic. The world,
and our legal system, may be describable in apparently mutually in-
consistent ways. This general sort of unavoidable dualism, as physi-
cists such as Niels Bohr have hoped, 47 may amount not to a dead end,
but to a surprisingly fruitful perspective from which to consider long-
standing problems of philosophy and society." The strangeness of
quantum mechanics need not commit us to anti-realism and the denial
of the ideal of objectivity in science or in the law. It may simply be
that the world is stranger than we thought.4 9
HERBERT, supra note 1, at 115-17; T. HEY & P. WALTERS, TI QUANTUM UNIVRWSE 21-23
(1987). Alternatively, others say that the concept of path or trajectory cannot be used with preci-
sion, W. HEISENBERO, ENCOUNTERS WITH ENISTEN 53-54 (1983), or that the idea of the path or
trajectory of a particle is meaningless. P. GmINs, supra note 24, at 52.
46. See W. HEISENBERO, supra note 25, at 10.
47. See N. BOHR, supra note 25, at 100.
48. See id. (referring to an "unvisualizable" duality of free will and determinism); Jones,
Complementarity as a Way of Life, supra note 6, at 320; Kothari, The Complementarity Princi-
ple and Eastern Philosophy, in NISs BoHR: A CENTENARY VOLUME, supra note 6, at 325. See
also Swinburne, Could God Become Man?, in PtLOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY 53, 53 (G. Vesey ed.
1989); Ward, God as Creator, in PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY, supra, at 109, 117-18.
49. See Shimony, Metaphysical Problems in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 18
INT'L PItL. Q. 3, 3 (1978). For variant statements of forms of quantum realism, see, e.g., D.
Bomb, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER 67-69, 109 (1983); B. D'EPAGNAT, REALITY AND
THE PHYSICIST: KNOWLEDGE, DURATION, AND -TH QUANTUM WORLD 147-49 (J. Whitehouse & B.
D'Espagnat trans. 1989); P. FORREST, supra note 5, at 11-12 (adopting realism in at least an
extended sense); H. KRips, THE METAPHYSICS OF QUANTUM THEORY 2-3, 31-32, 126-27 (1987)
(endorsing a modified form of realism incorporating indeterminacy and probabilism); Bub, Re-
view Article: The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, 40 BRIT. J. PIL. Sci. 191, 206 (1989)
(discussing Krips' realist account); K. POPPER, supra note 24, at xviii, 2, 175 (realism as compati-
ble with indeterminacy and probabilism); Maxwell, Quantum Propensiton Theory: A Testable
Resolution of the Wave/Particle Dilemma, 39 BaT. J. PHIL. Sci. 1, 3 (1988) (realism as compat-
ible with probabilism); Shimony, supra, at 13-14 (discussing realist approaches to overall quan-
tum systems, as opposed to their constituent parts).
Anti-realist or non-realist positions and those positions denying objectivity are similarly for-
mulated in a variety of ways. See P. DAVIES & J. BROWN, supra note 27, at 25 (under the "stan-
dard" or "Copenhagen" interpretation associated with Bohr and Heisenberg, "'atom' is simply
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In choosing between anti-realism and dualism, we must bear in
mind that, if we abandon realism and objectivity at the microscopic
level, we must abandon them for macroscopic objects as well,5 0
thereby abandoning, perhaps, an indispensable source of our motiva-
tion to explore and account for the world in the first place. 5 If the
desire to understand how the world "really," "objectively" is has
long motivated, and continues to motivate, the efforts of most scien-
tists, as a pragmatic matter we should be reluctant to sap what might
a convenient way of talking about what is nothing but a set of mathematical relations connecting
different observations"); P. GIBBINS, supra note 24, at ix ("Quantum mechanics is most easily
interpreted antirealistically, that is, as a theory which, though it works, does not describe the
way the world is.") (emphasis in the original); Gibbins, Quantum Logic and Ensembles, in
SPACE, TMEm, AND CAUSALITY 191, 204 (R. Swinburne ed. 1983); W. HEISENBERG, supra note 26,
at 16 (questioning the legitimacy of claims of objectivity); H. PAGELS, supra note 11, at 65
("[t]he world just isn't 'there' independent of our observing it; what is 'there' depends in part on
what we choose to see-reality is partially created by the observer"); Albert & Loewer, Two No-
Collapse Interpretations of Quantum Theory, 23 Nous 169, 174 (1989) ("[many of its adherents
tend to think of quantum theory not as a description of natural processes but merely as a calcu-
lational device for predicting the outcomes of experiments"); Folse, The Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion of Quantum Theory and Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, in 23 TuLANE STUDiES IN
PHLosoOPHY: SrUDmS IN PROCESS Pmaosoptr 32, 42-43 (R. Whittemore ed. 1974) (discussing
Bohr on the inseparability of subject and object); Mermin, Quantum Mysteries For Anyone, 78
J. PHL. 397, 397 (1981) ("[w]e now know that the moon is demonstrably not there when nobody
looks"); Rohrlich, Schroedinger's Criticism of Quantum Mechanics-Fifty Years Later, in Sym-
POSIUM ON THE FouNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS 555, 559 (P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt eds. 1985)
(the "Copenhagen" interpretation as "phenomenalist" and "instrumentalist").
While anti-realist formulations such as Mermin's, supra, remind us of Bishop Berkeley's phil-
osophical idealism, it is useful to recall that Bohr himself was unwilling to commit even to ideal-
ism. See Shimony, supra, at 12-13. For a sense of the congeniality of Berkeleyian idealism to
certain other interpretations of quantum theory, see, e.g., Folse, supra, at 37. Finally, for an
appreciation of the dispute about how central the role of consciousness itself may be in consti-
tuting the quantum world, compare P. DAVIES & J. BROWN, supra note 27, at 31 (conscious
observation, according to certain theorists, as triggering the collapse of a wave function's super-
posed possibilities into a particular "observed" concrete state of affairs) and A. RAE, supra note
24, at 63-64, 70 (same) with J. BELL, supra note 33, at 170 ("[t]he only 'observer' which is
essential ... is the inanimate apparatus which amplifies microscopic events to macroscopic con-
sequences") and P. DAvms & J. BROWN, supra note 27, at 32 (posing the question of what
counts as a consciousness sufficient to collapse the equivocal superposed wave function into a
single unequivocal reality) and A. RA, supra note 24, at 68-71 (discussing the implausibility of
large objects simultaneously existing and not existing, in a state of superposition, until conscious
observation at some point somehow dictates that these possibilities be instantaneously reduced to
one).
50. See supra note 16 & accompanying text. Some of the macroscopic consequences of
quantum phenomena are popularly discussed under the rubric of the fate of Schroedinger's cat.
See, e.g., Rohrlich, supra note 49, at 563-64.
51. Albert Einstein recalled that in his youth, "there was this huge world, which exists inde-
pendently of us human beings and which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least
partially accessible to our inspection and thinking." 1 A. EINSTEIN: PHLOSOPHER-SCIENTIST 5 (P.
Schilpp 3d ed. 1982). John Polkinghorne has observed more generally that "I have never known
anyone working in fundamental science who was not motivated by the desire to understand the
way the world is." J. PoLriNGHosRNE, supra note 11, at 79.
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turn out to be an indispensable, irreplaceable motivation by needlessly
or prematurely adopting a highly controversial interpretation of the
world that rejects any significant form of realism and objectivity.
IV. QUANTUM THEORY AND THE REALITY OF RELATIONAL HOLISM
Quantum theory and the experimentation it has inspired do not sim-
ply call traditional assumptions of realism and objectivity into ques-
tion. Recent developments in quantum theory and actual
experimentation have begun to offer an affirmative, constructive con-
tribution to our historical quest to understand the natural and social
world. A large and increasing number of scientists and quantum phi-
losophers have begun to see the world as more deeply relational and
holistic, and less a matter of discrete individuals, than most of us had
imagined. It is simply a matter of time before the implications of
quantum inseparability or quantum relational holism percolate
through to reinforce, inspire, or modify jurisprudential movements
such as feminist legal studies and legal economics. Feminists empha-
sizing relational thinking should be encouraged, while those legal
economists who put great stock in the reality of discrete, if perhaps
altruistic, individuals may be moved to reassess their position.
Even in the West, a sense of the importance of inseparability and of
something like relational holism did not originate with modern phys-
ics. Writers as diverse as, for example, John Donne, 52 Walt Whit-
man, 3 Thomas Merton,5' and Natan Sharansky"5 have expressed this
intuition. The idea of inseparability has long been present to some
degree even in orthodox, non-realist interpretations of quantum
theory 6 as well as in ambitiously realist interpretations. 7
52. See Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: Meditation XVII, in THE ComPLETE POETRY
AN SELECTED PROSE OP JomN DoNNE 441 (C. Coffin ed. 1952) ("No man is an fland, intire of it
selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine .... I am involved in Man-
kinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.") (italics in
the original).
53. See Song of Myself, in ComPLETm POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE 25 (J. Miller ed. 1959)
("every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.").
54. See T. MERTON, No MAN Is AN ISLAND xxii (1955) ("[elvery other man is a piece of
myself, for I am a part and a member of mankind.").
55. See N. SHAANsKY, FE"A No Evn. 360 (S. Hoffman trans. 1988) (referring to an experi-
ence of "a mystical feeling of the interconnection of human souls").
56. See, e.g., A. RAE, supra note 24, at 51 (discussing Bohr's view that the two particles in
a two-particle quantum system cannot be considered separate until a measurement is made to
separate them).
57. See D. BoHm, supra note 49, at 134. On Bohm's approach, quantum theory requires
"the dropping of the notion of analysis of the world into relatively autonomous parts, separately
existent but in interaction. Rather, the primary emphasis is now on undivided wholeness, in
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What might be called the "new" relational holism, however, has
received its major impetus from the theoretical and experimental re-
sponse to the theoretical work of the physicist John Stewart Bell, who
was motivated by a challenge posed by what is known as the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment.18 Einstein and his colleagues had
sought to question the completeness of quantum theory by means of a
thought experiment that relied on certain apparently uncontroversial
premises, including that of separability or local causality, which pre-
cludes instantaneous effects across distances. 9
In a simplified version of the thought experiment propounded by
Einstein and his colleagues, two particles prepared in what is referred
to as the "singlet spin state"' 0 are beamed from a common source in
opposite directions, so that they become apparently widely separated
in space. As each of the particles approaches a stationary but adjusta-
ble magnet and a detecting screen, it is deflected either up or down by
the magnet, and the results are recorded at the detecting screen. 61 The
experimental conditions are specified so that it seems inescapable that
the result of a measurement of either particle can depend only on the
state of that separate particle, including the lingering effects of its
prior interaction with the other particle and other "local" conditions
in the vicinity of the site of each measurement. 62
If that is so, the measurements of the spin of each particle along
various axes should be statistically independent of simultaneous mea-
surements or the results of measurements on the now distant other
particle. The joint probability of spin measurements along various
which the observing instrument is not separable from what is observed." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also Bohm, Bohr's Views Concerning the Quantum Theory, in NIELs BoHR: A CENTEN-
ARY VOLUME 156, 157-58 (A. French & P. Kennedy eds. 1985); Selleri, Introduction, in
QUANTUM MC.ANICS VERSUS LOCAL REALISM: THE EINSTEnI-PoDOLSKY-RosEN PARADox 47-49
(F. Selleri ed. 1988) (Discussing Bohm's view that "[i]n space there is only an 'unbroken whole-
ness,' which sometimes can give rise to manifestations which appear as two separate objects.")
(emphasis in the original).
58. For a discussion of the historical background of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought
experiment, see Jammer, The EPR Problem in its Historical Development, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS 129 (P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt eds. 1985).
59. See J. BE, supra note 33, at 143.
60. The singlet spin state implies that along a particular axis, the "spin" of the two parti-
cles will mathematically cancel each other, yielding a net or total spin of zero. See J. POLKINGH-
oRNE, supra note 11, at 70.
61. Cf. J. BELL, supra note 33, at 139-40. Bell discusses his theoretical response to this
experimental setup in the user-friendly language of the idiosyncratic choice of unmatching socks
by a Dr. Bertlmann. See id. at 139-58.
62. See Howard, Holism, Separability, and the Metaphysical Implications of the Bell Ex-
periments, in PILOsoPICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QuANTlru THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL's THE-
OREM 224, 228 (J. Cushing & E. McMullin eds. 1989). The "local" conditions can include any
persisting effects of the prior interaction between the two particles. See id. at 229 n.8.
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axes for both particles should reflect simply the separate probabilities
of the two measurements multiplied together. 6 Bell theorized, how-
ever, that if quantum theory were correct, the results of simultane-
ously measuring the spins along different axes of the apparently
separated particles should show a stronger correlation than could be
explained by any theory that assumed only "local reality," including
the lingering effects of the prior interaction of the particles." A re-
markable degree of apparent "cooperation" between the two particles
has in fact been observed in experiments conducted over a period of
years.
65
The derivation of the mathematical formulae tested in such experi-
ments is beyond the scope of this paper.66 It is the interpretation of the
experimental results that is of greater immediate interest. A range of
possible interpretations of the experimental results has arisen,67 and no
63. See id. at 228; Jarrett, On the Physical Significance of the Locality Conditions in the
BellArguments, 18 Nous 569, 573 (1984).
64. See B. D'EsPAGNAT, supra note 49, at 14-15. John Polkinghorne expressed the oddness
of what happens in this context by observing that the act of measuring a spin component for the
first particle must constitute or alter the second particle-rather than merely reveal or disclose
some preexisting fact-because measuring different spin components of the first particle seems
to produce "different and indeed contradictory" results for the now distant second particle. See
J. Pot.xiGoHoR, , supra note 11, at 70-71. Measuring the first particle's spin along the x-axis
"forces" the second particle's spin along the same axis to be the opposite. Thus, if the first
particle's spin along the x-axis is measured as "up," the second particle's spin along the x-axis
must definitely be measured to be "down." But if we choose instead to measure the first parti-
cle's spin along the z-axis, that measurement seems to force the second particle, inconsistently,
into an indefinite state of spin along the x-axis: an equal superposition of the states of spin "up"
and spin "down" along the x-axis. See id. Thus, depending on what we measure about the first
particle, the second particle's spin along the x-axis is either definite (let us say, "up") or indefi-
nite (both up and down). This result is, to put it mildly, a curious one.
65. See M. REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 107-13 (discussing laboratory tests of the Bell Ine-
qualities); Howard, supra note 62, at 229.
66. For a series of informal discussions of the derivation of the Bell Inequalities, see Mer-
min, supra note 49; Mermin, A Bolt From the Blue, in NELs Boss: A CENTENARY VOLUME 143-
45 (A. French & P. Kennedy eds. 1985); Mermin, Can You Help Your Team Tonight By Watch-
ing On TV? More Experimental Metaphysics From Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, in PhILo-
SOPICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QUANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S THEOREM 38 (J. Cushing
& E. McMullin eds. 1989). For a slightly more elaborate but still informal discussion, see d'Es-
pagnat, The Quantum Theory and Reality, 241 Sci. AM. 158 (Nov. 1979).
67. Among the exotic interpretations presented have been the possibility of retroactive or
"backward" causation, with future choices influencing the past, and of probabilities outside
their usual numerical bounds, including "negative" probabilities of the occurrence of an event.
See Selleri, Preface, in QuANTUM MECHANICS VERsUs LOCAL Ra, .Lss viii (F. Selleri ed. 1988).
The idea of sharp or well-defined quantum properties can also be questioned. See, e.g., Barreau,
Reality in Classical Physics and Reality in Quantum Theory, in SYMPosrum ON rHE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN PtYsics 73, 79 (P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt eds. 1985) (suggesting that sharp proper-
ties and locality or separability are difficult to test separately). Bernard d'Espagnat has pointed
out that we can account for the observed results not only by denying separability or locality, or
by adopting a less "realist" view of the world, but also by modifying our assumption of the
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single interpretation yet commands unanimous assent. Perhaps the
most intuitively plausible, apparently straightforward, and popular in-
terpretation, however, suggests that it is wrong to think of the two
particles, even though apparently separated by vast distances, as genu-
inely separate and discrete.
The terminology employed in such interpretations varies. Concepts
such as objective entanglement," nonlocality, 69 and nonseparability °
are used, sometimes in different senses,7' and sometimes in mutually
distinguishable ways. 72 The commonly used term that is perhaps most
resonant for the non-physicist is that of "holism. ' 73 The net result
seems to be "that tough-minded physicists have become the advocates
of a doctrine which historically was defended by tender-minded and
romantic writers." 74
While it is difficult to be precise at this point about just what sort
of holism the world seems to be presenting to us, it does seem appar-
ent that quantum-based holism is not simply a matter of the whole
being other than the sum of the parts, or that the states of the parts
do not exhaust or specify the state of the whole. Rather, the state of
the overall system cannot be reduced to the states of its component
parts, because the parts are simply not in definite states in and of
general validity of inductive inference. See d'Espagnat, supra note 66, at 158, 160. One could
simply find the experimental tests of the Bell Inequalities to produce mysterious correlations,
while denying the need for further explanation. See van Fraassen, EPR: When Is a Correlation
Not a Mystery?, in SYMosrUM ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYsIcs, supra, at 113, 113.
68. Shimony, Search For a Worldview Which Can Accommodate Our Knowledge of Mi-
crophysics, in PHnWsoPmcu CONSEQUENCES OF QuANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S
THEoanEM 25, 27 (J. Cushing & E. McMullin eds. 1989); Shimony, Contextual Hidden Variables
Theories and Bell's Inequalities, 35 Ba. J. PHIL. Sci. 25, 35 (1984); Shimony, supra note 16, at
46.
69. See B. D'ESPAONAT, supra note 49, at 15; Stapp, EPR: What Has It Taught Us?, in
SYMPOSIUM ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYsIcs 637, 638 (P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt eds.
1985); Weizsacker, Quantum Theory and Space-Time, in SYsOSIuM ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MODERN PHYSIcs, supra, at 223; Howard, supra note 62, at 225; Nordin, Determination and
Locality in Quantum Mechanics, 42 SYNTHE E 71, 71, 89 (1979).
70. See Howard, supra note 62, at 225; Jarrett, Bell's Theorem: A Guide to the Implica-
tions, in PHMOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QuANTum THmoRY 60, 79 (J. Cushing & E. McMullin
eds. 1989) (the apparently separated particles as somehow "connected" so as to "form a single
object"); Shimony, supra note 49, at 5.
71. See M. REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 116-17 (distinguishing five different senses of the
concept of locality).
72. See Bub, supra note 49, at 209 (distinguishing nonseparability from any sort of instan-
taneous action at a distance between particles); Howard, supra note 62, at 225-28 (distinguishing
nonseparability as the "source" of nonlocality).
73. See Howard, supra note 62, at 225, 227 ("a radical physical holism"); Shimony, supra
note 49, at 5. See also Rohrlich, supra note 49, at 569-70 (the measurement apparatus as inter-
acting with the whole system, not merely with one of the two particles).
74. Shimony, supra note 49, at 5.
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themselves. 7 Quantum holism is no less mysterious than any other as-
pect of quantum theory.
Even if we recognize, as we apparently must, that quantum holism
applies not merely to microscopic entities such as atoms, but to me-
dium-sized objects, such as human beings, 76 our traditional Western
version of common sense insists that we can think of individual per-
sons precisely as discrete individuals. Like a stage magician, we can
pass a gleaming metal hoop around an individual person, thereby
firmly establishing that no detectable delicate strands link individuals.
Unless we begin to think in Whitmanesque terms,7 7 we will continue to
insist, for all purposes, on the reality of discrete individual persons.
Perhaps the best way to accommodate this sense of individualism
with the experimentally revealed facts of the world is to think, as the
philosopher Paul Teller suggests, in terms of "relational holism. 78
According to relational holism, "objects which in at least some cir-
cumstances we can identify as separate individuals have inherent rela-
tions, that is, relations which do not supervene on the non-relational
properties of the distinct individuals." 79 We do not, as it were, start
with non-social human beings who then contingently choose to, or
somehow wind up, changing their identities by entering into social re-
lationships-altruistic, manipulative, sacrificial, or exploitive. Rather,
the identity of the human being is constituted as primarily or funda-
mentally by social relationships as by any other aspect of that person.
Identity is, in part, identity-sharing. What some mystics and sociolo-
gists have long argued for turns out to be suggestively reinforced, if
not confirmed, by physics.
One further implication should be drawn out. Relational holism
cannot be narrowly confined. Relational holism is nearly universal,
with respect not only to what or who is part of the whole, but also to
what or with whom we are related. An apt metaphor or analogy will
75. See id.
76. See Teller, Quantum Physics, The Identity of Indiscernibles, and Some Unanswered
Questions, 50 PHIL. Sci. 309, 318 (1983).
77. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Professor Henry Stapp has observed that
with the rise of relational holism within physics, a human "appears no longer as an isolated
automaton. ... This revision of the conception of a person ... cannot help but have an im-
mense impact on what is perceived as valuable. It must inevitably lead us away from the egocen-
tric bias that was the rational product of the ontology of classical physics .... " Stapp,
Quantum Theory and the Physicist's Conception of Nature: Philosophical Implications of Bell's
Theorem, in THE WosiD Vmw oF CONTMPORARY PHYsIcs: DoES IT NEED A NEW METAPHYSICS?
38, 57 (R. Kitchener ed. 1988).
78. Teller, Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics, 37 BRIT. J. PmL. Sci. 71, 73
(1986).
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
LESSONS FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS
not allow us to think of ourselves as inherently related merely to, say,
our favorite social or cultural group or category, while thinking of
others in exclusionary terms. The physicist Bernard d'Espagnat has
observed that:
Most particles or aggregates of particles that are ordinarily regarded
as separate objects have interacted at some time in the past with
other objects. The violation of separability seems to imply that in
some sense all these objects constitute an indivisible whole. Perhaps
in such a world the concept of an independently existing reality can
retain some meaning, but it will be an altered meaning and one
remote from everyday experience. 80 Thus, a universality of
relatedness is both inescapable and permanent."'
Tracing out the jurisprudential implications or the eventual influ-
ence, directly or metaphorically, of universal relational holism is a
task for the long term. As an initial guess, one might hazard that uni-
versal relational holism will encourage those elements in feminist ju-
risprudence that, while perhaps suspicious of some claims involving
the concept of universality, strongly emphasize the primacy of rela-
tions and relationalism in jurisprudential thinking. 82 Universal rela-
tional holism, on the other hand, would not appear to harmonize
particularly well with the strong individualism, whether altruistic or
selfish, often thought to underlie approaches to law and economics
that purport to describe the world, as opposed to merely instrumental-
80. D'Espagnat, supra note 66, at 181.
81. On this point, Nick Herbert has written that:
Since there is nothing that is not ultimately a quantum system, if the quantum phase
connection is "real," then it links all systems that have once interacted at some time in
the past... into a single waveform whose remotest parts are joined in a manner un-
mediated, unmitigated, and immediate. The mechanism for this instant connectedness
is . .. that a bit of each part's "being" is lodged in the other. Each [quantum entity]
leaves some of its "phase" in the other's care, and this phase exchange connects them
forever after.
N. HERBERT, supra note 1, at 223 (emphasis in original). See also Teller, supra note 78, at 80-81
("[T]he world is a more deeply intermeshed web than we thought. Indeed, according to quantum
mechanics, the extent of entanglement through inherent relations is all pervasive. Each and every
scattering interaction gives rise to inherent relations, so that every non-isolated object gets
caught up with other objects in the web of the inherently relational."); Howard, supra note 62,
at 248.
82. For references to the primacy of relations, see, e.g., Held, Feminism and Epistemology,
14 Pim. & PuB. AFF. 296, 299-302 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specu-
lations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BimLxYa Wom{N's L.J. 39, 40-43 (1985); Minow,
supra note 8, at 133; Scales, supra note 6, at 1383; Sunstein, Introduction: Notes on Feminist
Political Thought, 99 ETmcs 219, 219 (1989).
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ist versions of law and economics. 3 Neither does the idea of a univer-
sal inherent relatedness or inseparability of persons appear initially to
support at least the most thoroughly nihilist factions within the
broader Critical Legal Studies movement.8' These themes are traced
further in the concluding section below.
V. THE MANY-WORLDs VIEw AND THE EVACUATION OF
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
One final approach, or family of approaches,85 to the interpretation
of quantum phenomena deserves mention because of its growing pop-
ularity, unique status, and distinctive jurisprudential implications.
The many-worlds view combines spectacular initial implausibility and
some ultimately unattractive moral and jurisprudential implications
with what is in some ways the simplest and most straightforward ap-
proach to several daunting theoretical problems.
The many-worlds view or, in some variations, the "many minds"
view,86 offers at least the beginnings of an account of what happens
when, say, a quantum entity existing equivocally in a "superposition"
of states is somehow always observed to be existing solely in one, but
not both, of those two states. In a well-known example, a quantum-
entangled cat exists in a simultaneous combination or superposition of
83. Perhaps the most useful discussion in this regard is Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PI. & PuB. Ass. 317 (1977). For other
recent discussions of some of the relevant presuppositions of legal economic analysis, see Harri-
son, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L.
Rnv. 1309, 1309-13 (1986); Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Prem-
ises of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274, 275 (1983) (characterizing orthodox law
and economics as assuming that "[h]uman behavior is adequately described as utility-maximiz-
ing behavior of selfish, privatized individuals."); Kolm, Altruism and Efficiency, 94 ETmIcs 18,
18 (1983). For a sense of how a less purely "instrumentalist" legal economics might begin to
adapt to universal relational holism, see the merely contingent "entanglement" or inseparability
of utility functions referred to in Friedman, Does Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes? Mar-
shall Versus Kaldor, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1988). For a discussion of the idea of the sepa-
rateness of persons in utilitarian theory, see D. BRn, MORAL REALIsm AND TH FOUNDATIONS
OF ETmcs 283-89 (1989). Cf. Harman, Is There A Single True Morality?, in RELATIVISM: INTER-
PRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 363, 376 (M. Krausz ed. 1989) ("someone can be completely
rational without feeling concern and respect for outsiders.").
84. For a discussion of what might be characterized as the nihilist or irrationalist wing of
Critical Legal Studies, see generally Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 332
(1986).
85. See Healey, How Many Worlds?, 18 Nous 591, 591 (1984). For Professor Healey's own
interpretation of quantum mechanics, see Healey, Quantum Realism: Nafvet6 Is No Excuse, 42
SYNTrasE 121 (1979) and, more comprehensively, R. HEALEY, THE Px-LosoPHY OF QUANTUM
MECHI-CS: AN INTERACTIVE INTERPRETATION (1989).
86. See Albert & Loewer, supra note 7, at 207 ("an infinity of minds associated with each
sentient being."); Albert & Loewer, supra note 49, at 179, 181.
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the states of being completely alive and being completely deceased.
Quantum theory has offered no widely satisfactory account of the ap-
parent "collapse of the wave function" in which the superposed live
and deceased cats somehow snap into a determinate state of unequivo-
cal life, or of unequivocal death, before, during, after, or because of
our observation.
The many-worlds approach avoids the necessity of explaining a col-
lapse of the wave function, or of how one of the ghostly possibili-
ties-the live, or the deceased, cat-is mysteriously promoted to
observed reality. All of the quantum possibilities are realized on the
many-worlds view, and each is equally real.87 This simplicity is pur-
chased, however, at the price of prodigality in another respect. In an
unobserved way, the "universe is constantly splitting into a stupen-
dous number of branches, all resulting from the measurementlike in-
teractions between its myriads of components. Moreover, every
quantum transition taking place on every star ... is splitting our local
world on earth into myriads of copies of itself." 8 It has been sug-
gested that, according to such a view, roughly ten to the hundredth
power divergent "copies" or presentations of each identifiable "self"
may exist, 9 and that the total number of worlds now in existence may
amount to something like ten to the tenth power, to the twelfth
power. 90
The natural inclination at this point is to assume that we should
invoke Ockham's Razor9' against the many-worlds approach, and be
done with it. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the many-worlds
view unequivocally violates Ockham's Razor, at least in any sense fa-
tal to that view .92 While the many-worlds view multiplies entities-
indeed, universes-prodigiously, it may not do so needlessly, or with-
out any compensating gain in the simplicity or power of the interpre-
tation. Ultimately, it is not easy to say unequivocally whether the
87. See Everett, The Theory of the Universal Wave Function, in THE MANY-WoJLus INTER-
PRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 116-17 (B. DeWitt & N. Graham eds. 1973).
88. DeWitt, supra note 16, at 155, 161. See also Stein, The Everett Interpretation of Quan-
tum Mechanics: Many Worlds or None?, 18 Nous 635, 647 (1984).
89. See DeWitt, supra note 88, at 161.
90. See A. RAE, supra note 24, at 79.
91. For diverse statements of this principle, see 1 M. ADAMS, WILLIAM OCKHAM 156-60
(1987).
92. For an ultimately inconclusive debate as to the parsimoniousness of the many-worlds
view, see Clarke, supra note 16, at 319; Geroch, The Everett Interpretation, 18 Nous 617, 626
(1984); Healey, How Many Worlds?, 18 Nous 591, 599 (1984); Leslie, Observership in Cosmol-
ogy: The Anthropic Principle, 92 MIND 573, 579 (1983); Skyrms, Possible Worlds, Physics and
Metaphysics, 30 Pni. STuD. 323, 328 (1976).
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many-worlds view is parsimonious or not.93 By denying the need for
the collapse of the wave function by some entity or observer "out-
side" the quantum system, the many-worlds view can hold open the
possibility of a wave function, and a quantum description, for the en-
tire universe,9 which makes the many-worlds view attractive to cos-
mologists, 95 even if its appeal is still far from unanimous. 96
At this point, it is important for jurisprudential purposes to note
the rather dramatic effects of the many-worlds view on our common
conceptions of legal responsibility and the moral logic underlying the
policies of the criminal and civil law. We find many incomplete ver-
sions of the many-worlds view and many contrasting understandings
of responsibility and morality. The general nature of some of the
problems, though, seems clear.
Recall that the many-worlds view, on leading versions, involves
every quantum transition instantaneously splitting every object and
every person in the universe into multiple "copies.'' 97 Consider also
that "every choice we have made in our lives may be associated with a
quantum event in our brains." 9 Upon reflection, the jurisprudential
problems begin to multiply nearly as fast as the alternate worlds. As
one popular defender of an exotic version of the many-worlds view
has suggested, "If every time I choose, all of my parallel mes are also
choosing, then is there really any choice? If any choice means all of
them, then perhaps choice is just another illusion. "99
93. Cf. M. ADAms, supra note 91, at 160 (noting the difficulty in articulating the meaning
and importance of theoretical simplicity).
94. See Albert & Loewer, supra note 7, at 197.
95. See id; see generally J. LESLE, UmIVsEs (1989).
96. For representative criticisms, or questions regarding, the many-worlds view, see, e.g., J.
POLKINGHORNE, SCIENCE AND CREATION: THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING 24 (1989) (the many-
worlds view dismissed as too prodigal and contrived); I. PmooamIrz & 1. STENGERS, supra note 4,
at 228 (many-worlds view as "improbable"); A. RAE, supra note 24, at 81-83 (many-worlds view
as unclear on when splitting occurs or a measurement-like interaction occurs); Carr, On the
Origin, Evolution and Purpose of the Physical Universe, in PHYSICAL COSMOLOGY AND PHIoSO-
PHY 134, 152-53 (. Leslie ed. 1990) (many-worlds view, involving observation-based world-split-
ting, as "rather bizarre" and not recommended to be taken seriously); Swinburne, Argument
From the Fine-Tuning of the Universe, in PHYSICAL CosMowOY AND PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 154,
170-71 (many-worlds interpretatiot) as not reasonably justifiable); Albert & Loewer, supra note
7, at 201 (many-worlds view as involving unobservable violation of basic conservation laws
across the universe as a whole); Albert & Loewer, supra note 49, at 181 (same); Clarke, supra
note 16, at 331 (many-worlds view unclear on when world-splitting occurs); Healey, supra note
92, at 592-614 (discussing several interpretive problems); Linde, Inflation and Quantum Cosmol-
ogy, in THREE HUnDRED YEAS OF GRAvrrATION 627 (S. Hawking & W. Israel eds. 1987) (citing
several interpretive problems); Stein, supra note 88, at 651 (many-worlds view as not solving the
problem of observation in quantum theory).
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also J. BELL, supra note 33, at 135.
98. A. R A, supra note 24, at 80..
99. F. WOLF, PARALLEL UmVERSES: THE SEARCH FOR OTHER WORLDS 98 (1988) (emphasis
in the original).
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If every quantum transition involves the realization of all of the
quantum possibilities, then every airplane crash due, say, to metal fa-
tigue also involves one or more successful parallel flights,100 all of
which are equally real. The consequences, however, do not stop with
the comforting thought that even if we crash, multiple twins of our-
selves survive. The many-worlds view does not simply encourage what
would ordinarily be thought of as risk-taking behavior; the view jeop-
ardizes much of our understanding of responsibility and good con-
duct.
Consider, for example, a "many-worlds defense" at a quantum
murder trial. The defendant can argue that even if he, and not some
"copy," can be legitimately haled into court, his action did not result
simply in what we ordinarily think of as a murder. While there may
have been an intentional taking of another's life, the multiplication or
"production" of that same "victim's" life was inherent in the same
action for which the defendant is being tried. It is not as though the
defendant simply killed the victim; other versions of the victim sur-
vive, as "insurance," in worlds not observable to us. Quantum kill-
ing, rather, necessarily involves the multiplication of persons.
Undeniably, the grief of, say, the victim's surviving spouse, in any
world in which there was a murder victim, is quite real. That suffering
must not be ignored. But we will need to develop some explanation of
why the quantum murderer cannot point, at least in mitigation, to his
"production" of worlds in which the "victim" in this world goes on,
in those newly created worlds, with the "victim's" spouse, to lead
joyous, fulfilled lives. Those additional worlds, and that joy, are as
real as anyone's suffering. It may well be that a "well-designed"
quantum murder could increase not only the total amount of happi-
ness, or the total net excess of happiness over unhappiness, over all
worlds, but could increase the average amount of happiness, or aver-
age excess of happiness over unhappiness, even on a per world ba-
sis. 101
We will need, more generally, some account of why a person's de-
liberately producing diverse new "worlds" should be considered a
morally trivial act. If we assume, for whatever reason, that we are in a
good world, or an above average world, why aren't we morally well-
advised to spend most of our spare time running particles through
multi-slit apparatuses, thereby running off copies of good, or above
100. The airplane crash scenario is briefly mentioned in J. POLKINGHORNE, supra note II, at
68.
101. Consider, for example, a quantum murder weapon designed for many "no-death" re-
sults for every "death" result.
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average average, worlds? 10 2 If we assume the opposite, why isn't one
of our highest moral duties something we might call "quantum quies-
cence?" The fact, if it is such, that the same sort of world-splitting is
resulting all the time anyway from "natural" quantum transitions
throughout our world'03 does not show the incoherence of this under-
standing of our moral duty; it merely shows that, independently of
our will, the effects of our intentional efforts along these lines to cre-
ate good states of affairs, and not create bad ones, will be swamped
by what happens in nature.
This is not to conclude that our familiar conceptions of legal re-
sponsibility, exculpation, defense, and mitigation cannot possibly be
preserved if the many-worlds quantum view turns out to be right. But
given the jeopardy in which the many-worlds view places our sense of
legal responsibility, we may be led to ask anew whether it really offers
significant advantages. °4
102. We would thereby bring goodness into being just as surely and intentionally as if we
had exercised an ordinary moral virtue, such as being kind, in a single world. We would perhaps
even raise the average level of goodness of all worlds combined.
103. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104. For some persons, one of the attractions of the many- worlds view is its ability to mini-
mize the dramatic implications of what has been called the "anthropic coincidences." The idea
of anthropic coincidences refers to the apparent "fine tuning" or precise, knife-edge-balanced
tolerances involved-in independent and sometimes "overdetermined" fashion-in many of the
universe's basic physical constants and the relationships among basic particles and forces. Had
any of these balances, values, or relationships differed by a relatively small amount, no recogniz-
able sort of life would have been able to develop. That life exists anywhere at all in the universe
is, in view of the mathematics of probability, stunning. For discussions of the anthropic coinci-
dences, see R. ADAm, THE GREAT DESIGN: PARTICLES, FInLDS, AND TIE 366 (1987); J. BARROW,
THE WORLD WITHIN THE WORLD 352-65 (1988); J. BARROW & F. TPLER, THE ANTHRopic Cos-
MOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE (1986); S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANO TO
BLACK HOLES 125 (1988); J. LESLI, supra note 95, at 25-56; B. LovELL, EMRGmiG COSMOLOGY
196-97 (1981); H. MONTEFioRE, THE PROBABILrrY OF GOD (1985); J. POLKINOHORNE, supra note
96, at 22-23; Swinburne, supra note 96, at 154-72. The many-worlds view is enlisted at this point
as one of the more plausible means available to attempt to blunt the force or interest of the
anthropic coincidences. See J. LESLE, supra note 95, at 66-103; B. LovEu, supra, at 197; Smith,
The Anthropic Principle and Many- Worlds Cosmologies, 63 AusTRALASIAN J. PHn. 336 (1985).
If there are a huge number of diverse "worlds," including our entire observable universe as only
one of this huge number, it becomes much less surprising that intelligent observers are around to
survey at least one world permitting intelligent life.
Proceeding on the assumption that quantum theory can be applied to the entire universe, some
writers have sought to apply quantum theory to begin the task of supplying an explanation for
the existence of the universe itself. On such a theory, the universe would have spontaneously
bubbled up into being as an unusually significant, long-lived random "vacuum fluctuation,"
violating no conservation laws in the process. See J. BARROW, supra, at 231; T. HEY & P. WAL-
TERs, supra note 45, at 294; Thomsen, The Quantum Universe: A Zero-Point Fluctuation?, 128
Sci. NEws 72 (Aug. 3, 1985). For the view that the universe itself may be the ultimate free lunch,
or quasi-free lunch, see Blau & Guth, Inflationary Cosmology, in THRE HUNDRED YEARS OF
GRAvITATION 595 (S. Hawking & W. Israel eds. 1987); Grunbaum, The Pseudo-Problem of Cre-
ation in Physical Cosmology, 56 PI. Sci. 373 (1989); Guth & Steinhardt, The Inflationary
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VI. CONCLUSION: INDETERMINACY, OBJECTIVITY, AND UNIVERSALITY
IN LEOAL THEORY
Legal theorists of one perspective or another have occasionally been
willing to make the philosophically dramatic claim that quantum me-
chanics demonstrates "that nature is on our side .... ,,"1 We have
seen enough variety in the interpretation of quantum phenomena to
suspect that any such claim must be qualified, but it seems equally
clear that certain themes in quantum interpretation are at least some-
how congenial to parallel themes developed in legal theory. Some-
times, the support in quantum theory for particular legal theories will
be superficial and equivocal, 106 but the concord between quantum the-
ory and legal theory may on other occasions be striking.
One obvious focus of interest is the concept of indeterminacy. The
discussion above has offered at least some sense of the importance of
irreducible indeterminacy in some mainstream interpretations of
quantum mechanics. 107 The idea of irreducible indeterminacy also
looms large in much contemporary legal theory?10 Currently, indeter-
minacy theses are most obviously associated with the Critical Legal
Studies movement.1°9 Allan Hutchinson, for example, observes that
Universe, 250 ScI. AM. 116, 116 (May 1984); Weiskopf, The Origin of the Universe, 36 N.Y.
REv. Boors 10 (Feb. 16, 1989). For the convincing rebuttal that even a quantum "vacuum" is
more like a seething, roiling ocean of temporarily existing particles and antiparticles than like
anything that could qualify as presuppositionless or not calling for explanation, see J. Bamow,
supra, at 231; J. LEsus, supra note 95, at 80; M. Muwrrz, CosMic UNDESrANDING: PHLosopHY
AND SCIENCE OF THE UNIVEaSE 131-37 (1986); J. PomnGuNoRN, supra note 96, at 59-60; Craig,
God, Creation and Mr. Davies, 37 Barr. J. Pim. Scm. 163, 166-69 (1986). Ultimately, there is
something calling for explanation, by analogy, about a simultaneous "overdraft" and "deposit"
into one's checking account, even if the amounts exactly cancel each other. It is fair to conclude
that no plausible version of quantum theory avoids leaving interesting unanswered questions in
attempting to explain or account for the universe.
105. Scales, supra note 6, at 1401.
106. For example, Professor Ronald Dworkin's "chain-novel" metaphor for the historical
process of common law adjudication superficially parallels, in some respects, the physicist John
Wheeler's metaphor of a game of Twenty Questions, with no predetermined answer, to suggest
how all of natural history is constructed, or brought out of superposition, in a remarkably retro-
active way, by human observation itself. Compare Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA.
L. Rsv. 165, 166-68 (1982) (allowing some tolerance of inconsistency in the joint or serial prod-
uct of the creators for the sake of a "better story") with J. BARRow, supra note 104, at 360. For
discussions critical of the logic of Wheeler's approach, see J. LESLIE, supra note 95, at 93-95; J.
POL.NI ORNE, supra note 96, at 24-25.
107. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
108. See Note, supra note 4, at 1968.
109. See, e.g., A. ALTmAN, CamcAi LEOAL STUDIs: A LmEAL CRmTQuE 14-15 (1990);
Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck: Scientifc Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal The-
ory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 567-68 (1988); Herzog, supra note 8, at 628-29; Levit, supra note 1, at
286-87.
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"indeterminacy jeopardizes any mode of objective decisionmaking""10
and argues that "the law is irredeemably indeterminate."' In partic-
ular, "[w]ith imagination and industry, legal materials can be organ-
ized to support and justify incompatible outcomes.""' 2 Crucially, legal
interpretation "can never be detached from the identities and interests
of the interpreters."" 3
Now, a variety" 4 of more and less' controversial indeterminacy
claims can be formulated, not only by Critical Legal Studies adher-
ents, but by "pre-Critical" ' 6 and contemporary "non-Critical" wri-
ters as well,' 17 including even those associated with law and
economics."3 The inescapable variations among indeterminacy claims
simply ensures that there can be no dramatic and unequivocal conclu-
sion about what quantum indeterminacy says, if anything, about legal
indeterminacy in general.
On the other hand, the relationship between particular theories of
quantum indeterminacy and particular, concrete claims about some
aspect of legal indeterminacy is a nearly inexhaustible subject. Among
the most useful observations, though, are those "negative" observa-
tions addressing what quantum indeterminacy does not license in the
legal realm. For example, it is unclear how quantum indeterminacy,
on most views, provides any support for legal theories that necessarily
110. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43 U.
MiAw L. Ray. 541, 543 (1989).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 555. See also Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54
U. Cm. L. REv. 462, 462 (1987) (offering a similar initial generalized statement of what the
indeterminacy thesis is thought to involve).
113. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 543.
114. Compare, id. with D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?,
43 U. MtAw L. REv. 513, 513 (1989) (focusing on the indeterminacy of legal theories, as distinct
from the indeterminacy of statutes, case law, rules, etc.). See generally Solum, supra note 112.
For an example of a useful, narrow, more concrete indeterminacy claim, see M. TUSHNET, RED,
WHrrE AND BLUE: A CRITIcAL ANALYsis Op CONSTIUTIONAL LAw 15-16 (1988) (discussing the
importance of the selection of the level of generality of analysis of a legal issue).
115. See Fuller, supra note 109, at 567-68; Herzog, supra note 8, at 628-29.
116. See e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks On the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 395 (1950) (developing a
"moderate" indeterminacy thesis).
117. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528 (1988) ("The legal form
of plurality is indeterminacy-the susceptibility of the received body of normative material to a
plurality of interpretive distillations, pointing toward differing resolutions of pending cases
118. See, e.g., Posner, Rebuttal to Malloy, 24 V AL. U.L. Rav. 183, 184 (1990) ("Once we get
down to that genuine irreducible element of moral debate, I do not think economics will help;
nor I think, will moral philosophy."). See also id. at 183 ("I do not think moral discourse is
productive."). For a discussion of the allegedly more general indeterminacy of the economic
analysis of law, see Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 561-67.
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link indeterminacy in the law to a more or less politicized battle of
conflicting interests." '9 Planck's constant itself, for example, has a sin-
gle determinate value.'20 This value does not seem to be best explained
on the basis of being chosen by dominant groups or coalitions because
the value serves their distinctive interests.
Pragmatically, even if it served someone's interests to pretend that
we could construct, or reconstruct, Planck's constant as larger or
smaller than its present value, we would all soon run up against closed
doors that used to be open. We simply do not have much choice in the
matter. Either we adopt as the value of Planck's constant the value
which nature regularly seems to suggest to us, or our theory-laden
technological devices stop working.
This is of course not to minimize the role of conscious choice on
some interpretations of quantum theory.'21 Whether an electron pres-
ents itself to us, for example, as a particle or as a wave may depend
crucially on how we consciously choose to manipulate the experimen-
tal apparatus.' But even if, to choose another example, it is our con-
scious observation that collapses the superposed wave function of a
simultaneously deceased-and-not-deceased cat into either a deceased
cat, or else a live cat,'2 the actual determinate outcome does not flow
from our perceived interests or preferences at the time of our observa-
tion. If the apparatus has been set up so that the cat has a fifty per-
cent chance of survival as of the time we choose to collapse the wave
function by observing the cat, then we get a live cat half the time (or
in half the worlds), regardless of our interests or preferences concern-
ing the status of the cat. We do not in this sense have the power to
collapse superpositions in such a way as to make them come out the
way we want, on particular occasions or even as a statistical matter
over a run of trials, independently of how we have set up the experi-
mental apparatus.
To the extent that a legal indeterminacy thesis suggests that in some
or all cases persons making or influencing the decision can make that
legal decision come out in such a way as to suit their interests or
wishes by merely adopting one specific legal theory, there is less sup-
port for legal indeterminacy in the idea of quantum indeterminacy
than we might initially have imagined.
119. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 543. Of course, even if quantum theory does
not support this legal thesis, the legal thesis may still be independently supportable.
120. See supra note 29.
121. See, e.g., Mermin, supra note 49, at 397 ("We now know that the moon is demonstra-
bly not there when nobody looks.").
122. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87; Rohrlich, supra note 49, at 563-64.
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Indeterminacy theses in the law also naturally tend to impeach the
idea of objectivity in the law.124 Along with critical legal scholars,
many feminist legal theorists have called the idea of legal objectivity
into serious question.'25 While writers of varying approaches have
joined in such a call,' s focusing concretely on the feminist response to
legal objectivity is useful. As we might suspect, not all feminists agree
in their critique of objectivity, but skepticism as to claims of objectiv-
ity recurs.
Again, our focus must be not on whether any such critique of ob-
jectivity is ultimately on target, but whether such a critique is support-
able through quantum theory. This is, itself, an almost inexhaustible
issue. Certainly, on some interpretations of quantum mechanics, the
distinction between subjective and objective is strongly impeached. 27
There are, however, limits to any quantum-based critique of objectiv-
ity. Nature still seems to present us with what we might call "objective
hypothetical imperatives." If, for example, we choose to build quan-
tum-based machines, we must not expect them to work as intended if
we choose to pretend that Planck's constant should be given a numeri-
cal value hugely different from the value at which Planck arrived.' 28
As long as we recognize this kind of truth, then wondering about
whether statements about Planck's constant are in some sense "objec-
tively" true loses much of its urgency.
124. See, e.g., R. UNGER, THE CRITCAL LEGAL STUDES MOVEMENT 2-3 (1986); Hutchinson,
supra note 110, at 543 ("Indeterminacy jeopardizes any mode of objective decisionmaking.").
125. See, e.g., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuF-
FALo L. REV. 11, 23 (1985) (Mackinnon comments that "[wie are not allowed to question objec-
tivity as the measure of what we know."); supra note 82, at 49 (Menkel-Meadow raises the
possibility that at least some conceptions of "objectivity" may be distinctively male-associated);
supra note 8, at 132 (Minow comments that feminists are questioning "the idea of one truth or
one reality that can be discerned and agreed upon by all."); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HAsv. L. REV. 10, 33 (1987) ("No perspective asserted to produce 'the truth' is
objective, but rather will obscure the power of the person attributing a difference while exclud-
ing important competing perspectives."); Scales, supra note 6, at 1378 ("Feminist analysis be-
gins with the principle that objective reality is a myth."); cf. E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON
GENDER AND SCIENCE 148-49 (1985) (questioning the rigidity of the distinction between subjec-
tive and objective, particularly in the context of modern physics).
126. See, e.g., Callicott, Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics, 7
ENVTL. ETmcs 257, 267 (1985) (quantum theory, together with other advances in twentieth-cen-
tury science, has "forced the abandonment of the simple, sharp distinction between object and
subject."); Posner, supra note 118, at 183-84 (questioning the objectivity of morality); Williams,
supra note 17, at 441 ("Heisenberg's uncertainty principle suggest[s] that facts are no more ob-
jective than any theoretical construct."); Zimmerman, Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value, and
Panentheism, 10 ENVTL. ETmcs 3, 10-12 (1988) (responding to Callicott, supra).
127. Cf H. PAGELS, supra note 11, at 65 ("The world just isn't 'there' independent of our
observing it; what is 'there' depends in part on what we choose to see-reality is partially created
by the observer."). Cf Scales, supra note 6, at 1401 ("We do not separate the observer from the
observed.").
128. See supra note 29.
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Actually, it does not seem to be clear how philosophically deep the
feminist critique of legal objectivity needs to go. Even the long and
varied history of gender-based oppression through allegedly objec-
tively true assertions does not by itself establish whether the ideal of
aspiring to objective truth should be repudiated, purified and re-
formed, or taken seriously as a potentially progressive and liberating
enterprise. Professor Ann Scales has written, for example, that "we
must challenge the 'objective' standards which objectify us, which
make us invisible and our history unimportant." 129The very use of the
scare quotes by Professor Scales rightly suggests that what is claimed
to be objectively true can often be exposed as false and as irrationally
exclusionary. In particular, the legal patterns to which Professor
Scales objects can be shown to be objectively morally wrong.
Needless to say, the question of whether there are objectively right
ways for men to behave toward women, or any objective rightness at
all, is an important one. 30 There is obviously some risk in simply
abandoning the ideal of objectivity, in that it then becomes difficult to
show why individuals should, for example, recognize their own con-
duct to be oppressive, or cease their oppression, especially where such
conduct is widely engaged in and appears to serve the interests of
those engaging in such conduct.' 3'
It may be possible, then, for feminists to hold open at least a rede-
fined, 32 yet recognizable, sense of objective truth. This would allow
the full significance of developments such as the rise of relational
holism133 in quantum mechanics to be realized. The assertion that
quantum mechanics shows that "nature is on our side"' will not
likely be practically significant in the absence of a recognizable con-
cept of objectivity.
Of course, the discussion above in Section IV focuses not merely on
the quantum mechanics of relational holism, which again may be wel-
129. Scales, supra note 6, at 1376 n.15.
130. For a sense of the current status of the debate over the objectivity of morality, see, e.g.,
D. BRIN, supra note 83; RELATrvsSM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION (M. Krausz ed.
1989); ESSAYS ON MORAL REALtsm (G. Sayre-McCord ed. 1988); D. WoNo, MoAL RELATPrf
(1984).
131. See Rhode, supra note 8, at 620 & n.10. One may wonder, incidentally, whether there
are any leading critics of objectivity, of any school, who consistently avoid the temptation to use
language that refers to, necessarily implies, or clearly trades upon traditional notions of objectiv-
ity.
132. See Scales, supra note 6, at 1402.
133. See supra notes 52-84 and accompanying text.
134. Scales, supra note 6, at 1401. Actually, Professor Scales makes this claim apparently
not with reference to relational holism, but to "a less hierarchical structure, a multidirectional
flow of authority" that "[nlature itself has begun to evince." Id.
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comed by many feminists,' 31 but on the universality or near universal-
ity of that relational holism. 36 Admittedly, there is in much legal
feminism an explicit distrust of at least some forms of the idea of
universality. 37 But neither the idea of universality itself, nor the sort
of universality associated with quantum relational holism seem to be
the primary concern of feminist writers in this context. Rather, femi-
nist concern focuses on what is referred to as "abstract universal-
ity," 38 as opposed to concrete universality. Abstract universality is
thought to be exclusionary, or to elevate what is distinctively male
into an allegedly neutral, all encompassing norm. 39 Abstract univer-
sality may therefore amount only to a more or less avoidable biased or
distorted form of genuine universality.
Universality, no less than objectivity, is unavoidably at best an as-
pirational ideal, and it seems true-objectively-that attempts at uni-
versality must to some degree be partial. The idea of universality
admittedly has no doubt been, over the long term, a conceptual in-
strument of systematic abuse for repressive, inegalitarian ends. How-
ever, until it can be shown that the idea of universality itself, however
recognizably revised or fulfilled, is unredeemable and necessarily de-
structive of women's interests, there does not seem to be any inherent
conflict between the quantum mechanics of universal relational holism
and feminist jurisprudence.
Feminists may remain concerned that while relationalism may, for
whatever reasons, tend to be distinctively characteristic of women's
values,' 40 universalism tends to be particularly characteristic of male
values. 14' If this is so, then the universal relational holism suggested by
recent achievements in quantum mechanics may come to be seen as a
natural and valuable developmental synthesis of patterns
135. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
137. See Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
Rav. 291, 299 (1985) (arguing for "a decentered subject, relational at its core," but without
dissolving the self "totally in an all-encompassing community"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8,
at 43, 48; Minow, supra note 125, at 45; Scales, supra note 6, at 1388; Sunstein, supra note 82,
at 225.
138. See Cornell, supra note 137, at 293; Minow, supra note 125, at 45; Scales, supra note 6,
at 1388.
139. See Cornell, supra note 137, at 293; Minow, supra note 125, at 45; Scales, supra note 6,
at 1388; see also Sunstein, supra note 82, at 225 ("For feminists in particular, the problem is that
universalist claims have tended to exclude women or to make women's claims appear deviant
when measured against established norms.").
140. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 43 (citing the research of educational psycholo-
gists).
141. See id.
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characteristic of female and male reasoning. 42 Such a genuine synthe-
sis seems attractive. In any event, it is not premature to begin the
process of allowing developments such as universal relational holism
to influence legal theory.
142. See id. at 48 (suggesting, with certain qualifications, that moral maturity may involve
the ability to synthesize characteristically female and male patterns of moral analysis).

